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IN THE

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
No. 9360
THE CHElVIICAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
V.

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Defendant.

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ARGUMENT
I. Passage of Title to the Materials Is Controlled by
Article XVIII of Plaintiff's Contract, Not by the Provisions of the Contract Between United States Steel
Corporation and Blaw-Knox Company.
Although plaintiff generally agrees with defendant's
statement of facts in so far as they purport to summarize
various provisions of the contracts, the reason or necessity
for such analysis, particularly with reference to the contract between Columbia-Geneva Division, United States
Steel Corporation and The Blaw-Knox Company, remains,
as it has throughout the proceedings, unclear. As defendant points out at page 3 of its brief, the time of passage
of title to the materials purchased is critical, yet nowhere
in the contract between United States Steel and BlawKnox is there any provision which purports to deal with
this question. Repeated discussion and emphasis on provisions of this contract by the defendant which clearly
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deal with matters extraneous to the matter of passage
of title, tends only to confuse the real question in issue
here.
The attempt by the defendant to read into the contract
between United States Steel and Blaw-Knox a provision
which does not exist stems from its position "that it is
impossible to impose upon United States Steel Corporation
terms to which it did not agree." Apparently, the defendant is of the opinion that no one can be subjected to a
liability for the payment of taxes unless it expressly agrees
to the imposition of such taxes. In this opinion the
defendant is obviously in error. These taxes are imposed
by law, as enacted by the legislature of the State of Utah,
and as interpreted by the courts of this state. The parties
to a contract do not and cannot impose such taxes. They
can only contract in such a manner as to either effect their
dealings or transactions in such a way that liability under
the law is more or less clearly imposed upon one party,
or they may agree that one party will bear the ultimate
liability for such taxes.
United States Steel Corporation, with knowledge that
there would be subcontracts of the work to be performed
under the prime contract, was not in a position to exercise
complete control over the transactions which would result
in tax liability under the law. It was, however, in a position to protect itself from the ultimate liability for the
payment of any taxes. This it did by the inclusion of
Paragraph 15 of its contract with Blaw-Knox which
required Blaw-I{nox to indemnify and hold it harmless
from liability for any such taxes. It thereby imposed the
economic burden of the taxes on Blaw-Knox, and thus
eliminated from consideration an element of price that was
contingent and uncertain.
In the same manner, plaintiff, by limiting its liability
to taxes "levied upon" it, restricted the area of its
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ultimate liability for the payment of such taxes. This was,
as it is in all such contracts, an important factor in the
prices quoted by The Chemical and Industrial Corporation
in its bid for the job. It is plaintiff's position in this matter that there can be no valid levy of a use tax against it.
An examination of the provisions of the contract quoted
by the defendant separately, or of the instrument as a
whole, fails to support the defendant's contention that title
to the materials did not pass to United States Steel Corporation until "final acceptance" of the work. Paragraph
1 entitled "Description of the Work" is no more than that:
a description of the duties of the contractor. Paragraph 12
simply places the obligation of insuring the work during
construction on the contractor, a standard provision in
many construction contracts. Paragraph 4 is a typical
default provision, authorizing the owner to complete the
contract in the event of a default of the contractor.
The defendant has placed considerable emphasis on
Paragraph 24, relating to the final acceptance of the work.
Apparently it is its contention that no interest in the
facility passed to United States Steel Corporation until it
accepted the plant pursuant to Paragraph 24. The fallacy
of this reasoning has been discussed in detail in plaintiff's
original brief and it would serve no useful purpose to prolong the discussion of this point here. Suffice it to say
that the quoted portion of this provision set forth in
defendant's brief at page 11 makes it quite clear that
"acceptance" relates only to· an agreement on the part of
the owner that the operating plant rneets the specifications
contained in the contract as to operating performance and
efficiency and as to the quality of the finished product produced by the plant.
The further reference to Sales and Use Tax Regulation
Xo. 58, as a basis for imposing liability on The Chemical
and Industrial Corporation in this instance, is particularly
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inappropriate here since this Regulation, in its quoted
form, was not approved until May 27, 1959 and is expressly
made effective only on or after July 1, 1959. Prior to this
time the predecessor of this particular regulation was expressly made applicable only to the sales tax, and did not
contain the second sentence set forth in the quoted material.
II. Defendant's Interpretation of the Meaning and Effect
of Article XVIII of the Contract Between Plaintiff
and the Blaw-Knox Company Is Erroneous.
As plaintiff indicated in its original brief, and contrary
to the statement of the defendant at page 16 of its brief,
plaintiff contends that the title to the materials here
involved passed upon delivery, rather than at the time
they were delivered and stored at the site. Plaintiff believes, however, that irrespective of whether title passed
upon delivery or at the time the materials were delivered
and stored, no taxable moment existed when plaintiff
could be subjected to liability for the tax imposed in this
case. If plaintiff is correct that title passed upon delivery,
then any reference to the provisions of the use tax law
relating to storage are extraneous. But even if title did
not pass until the materials were delivered and stored,
there would still be no taxable moment when plaintiff was
subject to the tax.
Plaintiff has shown that even a tax on storage, in order
to be valid, must be a tax imposed on the exercise of a
right of ownership in property. In the present context, the
question then becomes: ·when were the materials stored~
The answer is, of course, when they were placed on the
ground at the job site after the termination of their
transit in interstate commerce. Mud Control Laboratories
v. Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P. 2d 854 (1954), cited at
page 13 of plaintiff's brief. At this precise instant title
to the materials was in the United States Steel Corporation.
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In this connection, your attention is directed to the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. L. R.R. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249
(1933). Here the State of Tennessee asserted liability for
an excise tax on the storage of gasoline imported by the
petitioner from other states and unloaded by it into storage
tanks from which it was subsequently withdrawn and used
by petitioner to provide motive power for its equipment
used in interstate operations. In upholding the tax, the
Court stated at 266:
The gasoline, upon being unloaded and stored,
ceased to be a subject of transportation in interstate
commerce and lost its immunity as such from state
taxation .... The oil in storage was not a subject of
interstate commerce and so was a part of the common
mass of goods within the state, subject to local taxation.
And again at pages 267-8:
The power to tax property, the sum of all the rights
and powers incident to ownership, necessarily includes
the power to tax its constituent elements.... Hence,
there can be no valid objection to the taxation of the
exercise of any right or power incident to appellant's
ownership of the gasoline, which falls short of a tax
directly imposed on its use in interstate commerce.
Here the tax is imposed on the successive exercise of
two of these powers, the storage and withdrawal from
storage of the gasoline.
Thus, it is apparent that for tax purposes, storage does
not take place until the materials are placed in storage.
Furthermore, it is equally clear that in order for the tax
to apply, the storage must be that of the owner of the
property. In the present case, the essential element of
ownership was lacking, and, therefore, the tax cannot be
applied to the plaintiff.
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III. Defendant's Argument that There Was a Taxable
Moment When ·Plaintiff Was the Owner of the Ma.terials and Subject to a Tax Is Not Supported by the
Authorities.
The defendant relies principally on the decisions in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167 (1939) and
Pacific Telephone .& Telegraph Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S.
182 (1939) to support its contention that plaintiff was
the owner of the materials during a taxable moment when
it was subject to the tax sought to be imposed here. An
analysis of these cases and the decisions following and
interpreting them, however, do not support this contention.
These decisions of the Supreme Court clearly taxed the
exercise of two rights of ownership: (1) storage, or the
retention of materials after the interstate transit ended;
and (2) use, or the subsequent installation of the materials
in the taxpayer's operations, both of which occurred subsequent to a "taxable moment" after the delivery of the
materials and after the interstate transportation of them
ended. This is the interpretation placed on these cases by
this Court. See Union Pacific R.R. v. Utah State Tax
Cmnntission, 110 Utah 99, 169 P. 2d 804 (1946) and
Southern Pacific Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 106
Utah 451, 150 P. 2d 110 (1944).
Further, in this connection the language of the court
in the decision of Chicago Bridge.& Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19
Cal. 2d 162, 119 P. 2d 945 (1941) cited by the defendant,
is particularly appropriate. Here, the petitioner, a builder
of storage tanks and qualified to do business in California,
shiped tanks in a ''knocked down'' condition to a point
at or near its customer's premises where they were
unloaded and stored pending reassembly by plaintiff on
the site. In holding plaintiff subject to the California use
tax, the court stated at 170, 119 P. 2d at 949:
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In the instant case the tax was levied on the storage
and use of the materials which were purchased and
fabricated into tank parts, that storage and use consisting of the time after the materials arrived and
while they were awaiting assembly and erection by
the plaintiff, and the subsequent installation and
erection thereof. The interstate transit had ended
when the tank parts arrived at their destination near
and/ or adjoining the customer's premises and awaited
assembly in so far as their being subject to the tax
was concerned. That was the commencement of the
taxable moment; that was the taxable intrastate event
which occurred after the interstate transit had ceased.
(Emphasis added.)

IV. The Contention of the Defendant that Plaintiff Was
Present in the State of Utah Is Without Basis in Fact,
and There Is No Authority for Such Position in Law.
The defendant has apparently based its contention that
plaintiff was present in the State of Utah solely upon the
basis of a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of the
United States some 33 years ago, and which decision does
not involve the application of a use tax but rather is concerned with a question of the validity of the imposition
of a fine or penalty for failure to timely qualify to do
business within the State of Arkansas. The defendant has
quoted at length from this decision in support of its contention that plaintiff was engaged in business in the State
of Utah.
Upon closer examination of the facts involved in this
decision, Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas,
269 U. S. 148 (1925), the dissimilarity between the situation which existed there and in the present case becomes
quite obvious. In addition to the fact that the Court was
concerned with the application of a penalty provision for
failing to qualify to do business at the proper time rather
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than with the application of a state use tax, it is apparent
from the opinion that the Kansas City Structural Steel
Company, against whom the penalty was assessed, went
considerably further in. its operations within the State
of Arkansas than has plaintiff here in the State of Utah.
In that case, the plaintiff submitted a bid to a governmental
agency in Arkansas for the construction of a bridge in
that state. The bid and the contract covering the work
were executed in Arkansas. Materials were shipped from
Missouri to a point near the site of construction in
Arkansas and were received by the plaintiff at this point.
Thereafter such materials were delivered by the plaintiff
to its subcontractor and were ultimately used in the performance of the contract.
In the present case plaintiff submitted no bid to anyone
in the State of Utah nor was any bid accepted or contract
executed within the State of Utah. Nor did plaintiff here
subcontract only a portion of the work retaining some
actual construction work itself as did the plaintiff in the
Kansas City Structural St·eel Company case. All work
to be performed by plaintiff under its subcontract with
the Blaw-Knox Company was sublet to The Chemical and
Industrial Construction Company and plaintiff's subcontractor was required under the terms of its contract with
plaintiff to undertake not only all construction work but
the receipt, unloading, and hauling of all 1naterials to be
used in connection with the work.
The materials purchased by plaintiff and ultimately used
in the work were addressed and shipped to The Chemical
and Industrial Construction Company at the job site near
Geneva, Utah. Not only did plaintiff not receive the
materials in Utah, it also did not undertake any actual or
physical delivery of any materials to its subcontractor. In
contradistinction to this it would appear from the opinion
of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Arkansas
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

that the plaintiff in Kansas City Structural Steel Company
case was actually present and made actual physical deliveries of the materials to its subcontractor. This is apparent from the following quotation from the case contained in
the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 161 Ark.
483, 256 S. W. 845 at 847:
Here the facts warranted the trial court in finding,
and evidently it did find, that the appellant shipped
the materials necessary in the construction of this
bridge to Dermott, and there established the emporium
or warehouse, from which it furnished to the Yancey
Construction Company all the material the latter company required to do the work under its contract.
Thus, the basis for the Court's determination that the
interstate shipment had ended is clear. The materials had
been shipped to some point near the construction site,
and there received by the plaintiff and stored temporarily
until they were subsequently actually and physically delivered by the plaintiff to its subcontractor as they were
needed in the course of construction. This is an entirely
different situation from that involved in the present case
where the only interruption in delivery from points outside
the State of Utah to the job site was a possible change
in the mode of conveyance from rail to truck.
Plaintiff is at a loss to understand the basis for the
defendant's contention that the decision in Kansas City
Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas, supra, a decision rendered
thirty-three years ago, not involving the application of
either a use or sales tax, and not even mentioning the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
can be urged as authority for the proposition that the
attempted exaction of a use tax from plaintiff in these
circumstances is a valid exercise of the taxing power and
authority of the State of Utah and not proscribed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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V. The Terms of the Contract Between United States Steel
and Blaw-Knox Were Not Ambiguous, and the Testimony Elicited from Mr. Gage Was Improper.
The defendant attempts to justify the questions directed
to Mr. Maynard Gage, an employee of United States Steel
Corporation, and the answers elicited from him on the
ground that the contract between United States Steel
Corporation and the Blaw-Knox Company was ambiguous
and incomplete. No attempt was·ever made by the defendant to establish, as a foundation for the admission of such
evidence, the ambiguity of the contract, and certainly, the
introduction of the evidence could not be sustained on the
ground that the contract was incomplete. Plaintiff believes
that it is obvious that the defendant was simply trying
to add to the contract a provision it did not contain.
To say that because the plaintiff cited a provision of
this contract as evidencing as much support for plaintiff's
position as other provisions of the same contract cited by
the defendant supported it, is in itself evidence of the
ambiguity of the contract is evading the question. Plaintiff's complaint is simply that defendant, by trying to
establish its position by reference to certain provisions of
the contract which do not purport to deal with the matter
the defendant seeks to establish, creates ambiguity. This
is the natural and inevitable consequence of trying to add
to the contract a provision which is not there. The ambiguity is not in the contract itself, but only arises from the
defendant's attempts to prove that two plus two equals five.
Although not related specifically to any particular point
here involved, the defendant at page 18 of its brief urges
the affirmance of the decision of the State Tax Commission
on the ground that to rule otherwise would be tantamount
to. opening the flood gates of tax avoidance to the great
detriment of intrastate contractors and sellers of such
materials. Plaintiff submits that this is not the case. First,
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plaintiff wishes to make it quite clear that the avoidance
of the payment of the use tax in this instance was not the
reason for conducting its business in the manner in which
it is carried on. This method of operation was in effect long
before the project for United States Steel Corporation at
Geneva, Utah was even contemplated. The design and the
construction of complicated petro-chemical complexes are
two separate and distinct operations, requiring different
types of personnel, methods of operation, etc. Second, a
holding that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of the
use tax in this proceeding is not the· equivalent of saying
that no tax is due as a result of the construction of these
facilities. To the contrary, it seems entirely plausible
that someone other than the plaintiff may well owe such a
tax. But liability cannot be imposed upon the plaintiff
simply because a tax may be due and owing as a result of
the construction work. Finally, even if it was determined
that no tax was due in this instance by anyone by reason of
a gap or omission in the law, it is not the function of
either the State Tax Commission or the courts to remedy
the situation. The remedy lies with the legislature of the
State of Utah.
VI. Conclusion.
Plaintiff submits that in the light of the facts and the
authorities there exists no basis for the imposition of liability for the payment of the use tax in this instance on
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the plaintiff, and that accordingly, the decision of the State
Tax Commission should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
J E,RRY L. CowAN,
FROST & J .A COBS,

2300 Union Central Building,
Cincinnati 2, Ohio,
Attorneys for Plain.tiff.
Of Counsel:
DAVID E. SALISBURY,
VAN CoTT, BAGLEY, CoRNWALL

&

McCARTHY,

65 South Main St.,
Salt Lake City 11, Utah.
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